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Abstract
Black and Asian people in the United Kingdom are more likely to be stopped and
searched by police than White people. Following a panel of 36,000 searches by 1,100
police officers at a major English police force, we provide officer-specific measures
of over-searching relative to two baselines: the ethnic composition of crime suspects
officers interact with and the ethnic composition of the areas they patrol. We show
that the vast majority of officers over-search ethnic minorities against both baselines.
But we also find that the over-searching by individual officers cannot account for
all of over-representation of ethnic minorities in stop and search: Over-patrolling of
minority areas is also a key factor. Decomposing the overall search bias we find the
the over-representation of Asian people in stop and search is primarily accounted for
by over-patrolling while the over-representation of Black people is a combination of
officer and patrol effects, with the larger contribution coming from officers’ biases.
Introduction
Ethnic minorities are over-represented in police searches compared to White people. In
England, Black and Asian people make up 11% of the population, yet they account for
30% of all English police searches, called stop and search1.
Search decisions come with considerable consequences: searches can create feedback
loops where an individual is repeatedly searched because they were searched in the past2,3
which increases their likelihood of being arrested, thereby creating further feedback loops
in the criminal justice system4,5. High levels of searches further result in diminished
citizen engagement with police, diminished political engagement, reduced perceptions of
police legitimacy and trust in police6,7, 8, 9, 10, 11. In addition, invasive search encounters
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can result in psychological harm to searched individuals, leading to increased symptoms
of stress, anxiety and trauma12,13,14.
It is therefore crucial to understand the reasons for the over-searching of ethnic mi-
norities. Here we explore ethnic bias in search decisions at the officer level by focusing
on individual officers’ levels of bias and factors shaping these biases. Our approach is
two-fold. First, we investigate officers’ search biases against an ethnic group relative to
two officer-specific baselines: the ethnic composition of crime suspects and of the areas
they patrol. Second, we then examine the contributions of officers’ search biases and of
biases in deployment decisions to the over-representation of ethnic minorities in stop and
search.
We demonstrate that the majority of officers over-search Asian and Black people,
whichever baseline we compare their searches against. Our results show that officers per-
form more searches of ethnic minorities than can be explained by the ethnic composition
of the areas officers patrol or of the crime suspects officers interact with. However, over-
searching by individual officers cannot account for all of the over-representation of ethnic
minorities in stop and search. Over-patrolling is part of it: The median officer in our
sample patrols areas which are 1.16 times more Asian and 1.37 times more Black than the
West Midlands police force area. In other words, police officers are deployed to more eth-
nically diverse areas. Such deployment decisions contribute to the over-searching of ethnic
minorities15,16. We find that these biases in deployment decisions multiply with individ-
ual officers’ biases. Both together account for the overall bias against ethnic minorities in
stop and search.
Our approach and results connect to a rich literature on stop and search, and on eth-
nic bias in policing more generally. Stop and search in the United Kingdom is a widely
used policing power characterised by police forces as a crucial tool to prevent and inves-
tigate crime17,18,19. If achieving these aims justifies persistent ethnic disparities has been
powerfully challenged in the landmark Scarman and MacPherson reports which rejected
police explanations for disproportionate use of stop and search and instead described it
as a prime example of institutional racism20,21,22,23. Furthermore, the empirical evidence
suggests that stop and search has, at best, only minor effects on crime. Most studies,
especially those conducted in the United Kingdom, do not find any evidence of crime
reductions in response to stop and search14,24,25,26,27,28.
Police frequently attribute the over-representation of ethnic minorities in stop and
search to their over-representation in crime, implying that ethnic minorities perpetrate
more crime than White people17,18,19,29,30,31,32. This argument can result in a self-fulfilling
prophecy because the process of observing and recording crime already depends on the
wider social context of policing. In this context, deployment decisions15,33,34,35,36, arrest
probabilities5,37 and the accurate recording of crime38,39 are not independent of ethnic
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group. As a consequence, crime data are not an objective benchmark of true criminal
behaviour. In our work we do not take this into account for a simple reason: We are in-
terested whether police officers’ actions match the benchmarks they assemble themselves.
Thus we compare officers’ stop and search decisions to their own encounters with crime
suspects.
In light of police’s potential to criminalise minorities, the role of ethnic bias in police
decision-making deserves further inquiry. Police officers operate within the tension be-
tween their roles as individual decision-makers and agents of the institution of the police,
influenced by the organizational protocols and structures17,40,41. At the individual level,
there is ample evidence of biased attitudes held by police officers as well as of racially
or ethnically motivated behaviour42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51. Ethnic bias at the institutional
level is equally important. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in 1999 with its emphasis on
institutional racism has sparked a varied discussion on the role of police forces in creat-
ing ethnic disparities in the United Kingdom52,53,54. Two factors have been highlighted
in particular: First, structures within the police force perpetuate and broadcast biased
beliefs through various hierarchies17,23,52,54. Second, deployment decisions by the police
force—that is, decisions about which areas to prioritise and deploy officers to—are under
scrutiny, given that these decisions can create disparities at the population-level, inde-
pendently of how individual officers behave22,23. Deployments are also often targeted at
specific behaviours such as drug use in specific neighbourhoods, often deprived and ethni-
cally diverse. These types of targets raise concerns about the criminalisation of minority
communities16,22.
Officer teams are intermediaries between officers and the police force, often with their
own norms and cultures40,53. A recent study noted remarkable differences between dif-
ferent teams within the same English police force: Teams tasked with proactive policing
not only performed the highest number of searches within the force but were also over-
searching Black people at higher rates than other teams55. In our analysis we explore the
relevance of officer teams by accounting for differences between teams and by including
the ethnic composition of officers’ teams into our model.
The tension between individual and institutional behaviour also applies to other polic-
ing activities such as drug enforcement5,16, arrests56 and use of force57. The literature on
use of force in particular is currently debating an important consequence of this tension:
What is the appropriate level of analysis of use of force data? We will briefly outline this
debate since the analysis of stop and search data is characterised by the same tension
and because our results can directly speak to an ongoing discussion within the use of
force literature. In the United States, Black people are subject to higher rates of police
use of force, particularly lethal use of force, than White people relative to their shares in
the population57,58. Some studies have argued that the general population in an area is
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not the appropriate comparison: Instead one should compare rates of use of force to how
often Black and White people come into contact with police59,60,61. After conditioning on
the rate with which police encounter Black individuals, Fryer61 finds a reversal of ethnic
disparities: Police are apparently less likely to employ lethal force on Black people than
White people.
An issue with this approach is pooling: Fryer61’s analyses are at the police department
level, pooling all officers together. However, if officers are not homogeneous and differ in
how often they encounter Black people or differ in how biased they are against Black
people, then pooling their data can lead to erroneous conclusions. This phenomenon,
called Simpson’s paradox, is explicitly considered by Ross, Winterhalder and McElreath62:
In response to Fryer, they develop a generative model where all officers are biased against
Black people but differ in how often they encounter them. Already a small group of
officers which encounters Black people at high rates is sufficient to confound the pooled
analysis and point toward anti-White biases (when in fact all officers exhibit anti-Black
bias by construction). In other words, pooled analyses of use of force data can fail to
detect ethnic bias with heterogeneous police officers62,63,64.
The pooling problem directly applies to pooled analyses of police searches. If offi-
cers differ in how often they encounter criminals of different ethnicities, then a police
department level analysis of searches conditioned on crime can be confounded and fail
to identify the direction of the disparity. Generally, analyses of searches tend to find
over-representation of ethnic minorities even after conditioning on crime. For example,
Gelman, Fagan and Kiss65 find over-representation of Black and Hispanic people in pedes-
trians stops-and-frisks in New York City after adjusting for race-specific representations in
crime, a pattern substantiated in other analyses35,66. In addition to pedestrian searches,
traffic stops (where similar ethnic biases persist67) are often compared to benchmarks of
criminal behaviour68,69,70,71,72. All of these analyses are performed at the police depart-
ment level meaning that they could be potentially confounded.
Internal bench-marking is an officer-specific approach which matches each police officer
to similarly-situated officers73. The officer’s behaviour is possibly problematic if it deviates
substantially from their peers’. A drawback of this method is that it can only reveal
individual officers’ biases relative to their peers. For example, only 15 out of 2,756 officers
of the New York Police Department are flagged as potentially biased73, far too few to
explain the overall level of over-representation of ethnic minorities in stop and search.
In our study, we explore stop and search behaviour at the level of the individual officer,
following a panel of officers over time. We compare an officer’s searches of an ethnic group
to the officer’s direct experiences of the crime involvement of this group. By not pooling
our data we thereby circumvent the issue of Simpson’s paradox.
Our analysis is focused on so-called suspicion searches. In the United Kingdom, police
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officers routinely stop and question members of the public. During these unrecorded
conversations, officers can ask individuals to account for themselves. If at any point the
officers form a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the person is in possession of illegal items such
as weapons, drugs or burglary tools or in possession of stolen items, officers can initiate
a search of the person’s clothing and belongings74.
At this point, the encounter must be recorded in the form of a stop and search record
detailing information about the searched person and the officer’s justification for the
search. At the end of the search encounter, the searched person has to be supplied with
a reference number to the record. A search may be initiated only under powers requiring
‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ as detailed or with prior authorisation. In our analysis
we restrict our attention to suspicion searches, which account for 99.4% of all searches,
because only these searches are initiated at the discretion of the searching officer.
Our data consists of records of searches between 01/04/2014 and 30/09/2018 provided
by West Midlands Police in England as well as all recorded crimes in the same period.
In our analysis we use self-defined ethnicity, which is someone’s response to the question
“What is your ethnic group?”. We focus our analysis on Asian, Black and White people
because sample sizes are too small for the remaining Mixed, Chinese or Other groups.
In our analysis we rely on two officer-specific baselines: the crime suspects an officer
encounters and the residents in the officer’s patrolling area. We obtain the crime suspect
information by linking officers to the reported crime cases they responded to and then
counting the person(s) suspected by police of having committed the offense. For the
patrolling information, we calculate how often an officer visits a given geographical census
unit using additional patrolling data and obtain an officer-specific patrol intensity share
for the area. We use the smallest geographical unit provided by the 2011 ONS census,
2011 Output Areas75. We then multiply the number of residents in each census unit with
the intensity share and sum them to obtain patrolling intensity-weighted counts of the
residents in an officer’s patrolling area.
Together our data form a panel of search counts, crime suspect counts and patrol
counts for each officer over 9 half-year (6 month) intervals. We summarise this data in
Table 1. Using a Bayesian Softmax regression model (sometimes also called Multinomial
logit model) we then infer search shares p, crime suspect shares ζ and patrol population
shares ρ for each officer i in time period t. They represent the share of each ethnic group
e in the officer’s searches, crime suspect encounters and patrol counts, respectively.
These shares form the basis for our two measures of over-searching:
1. DS, officer over-searching relative to crime suspects. For each officer we obtain DSite
by dividing the officer’s search share p of ethnic group e in time period t by the
officer’s suspect share ζ of e in t. If DS is larger than 1 then the officer over-searches
an ethnicity relative to how often they encounter the ethnic group as crime suspects.
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If DS is smaller than 1 then the officer under-searches an ethnic group relative to
suspects and if DS is exactly 1 then the officer searches that ethnicity at the same
rate as they appear in the officer’s crime suspects.
2. DP , officer over-searching relative to patrol. For each officer we obtain DPite by
dividing the officer’s search share p of ethnic group e in time period t by the officer’s
patrol share ρ of e in t. DP has the same interpretation as DS: If DP is larger
(smaller) than 1 then the officer over-searches (under-searches) that ethnic group
relative to the ethnic composition of the area they patrol.
For example, for the median officer Asian people make up 23% of their searches, 15% of
the crime suspects they interact with and 23% of the areas the officer patrols. Officer over-
searching of Asian people relative to crime for this officer is DS = 0.23/0.15 ≈ 1.53 which
means that the officer over-searches Asian people relative to crime suspects by a factor
of 1.53. Officer over-searching relative to patrol for this officer is DP = 0.23/0.23 = 1,
meaning that this officer searches Asian people about as much as they encounter Asian
people on patrol.
Such over-searching or bias is not equivalent to discrimination. Conclusively attribut-
ing empirical patterns of disparities to ethnic or racial discrimination is challenging64,76,77.
We believe it is nonetheless important to uncover, document and dissect ethnic disparities
because differential rates of contact with police entail far-reaching consequences for the
criminalisation of ethnic minority groups and, not least, the legitimacy of the institution
of police. In our study we make two important contributions to the literature on ethnic
bias in policing: First, we provide officer-specific measures of search bias relative to the
crimes suspects an officer encounters and relative to the population in the area the officer
patrols. Second, we find that officers’ search biases are smaller than search bias on the
police-force level, suggesting that deployment decisions contribute to the overall search
bias against ethnic minorities in stop and search.
Results
We perform Bayesian inference. Before seeing the data, we have prior information about
likely values of the parameters which are updated with the likelihood of the data to obtain
the posterior distribution. A sample, sometimes also called draw, from the posterior is
a plausible parameter value consistent with the prior information and observed data.
We provide 90% uncertainty intervals for the parameters, sometimes also called credible
intervals78. 90% of our posterior distribution over the parameter lies within the 90%
uncertainty interval.
We present our results in three parts: (i) estimation of search shares, (ii) measures of
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over-searching DS and DP and (iii) the discrepancy between officer-level and force-level
search bias.
Inference of search shares
We infer pite, the share of each ethnic group e in officer i’s searches in time period t, as
a function of the officer’s suspect shares and patrol shares in time period t, and their
gender, age, experience, ethnic group and the share of White officers in their team. The
model is described more formally in the Data & Methods section.
Figure 1 shows the posteriors of pite for each ethnic group over all officers and time
periods based on the full model. Due to the aggregation over officer-specific posteriors
they represent the (posterior) behaviour of the entire workforce of searching officers and
show that searches by the median police officer are 23% Asian, 15% Black and 60% White
(with the remainder due to rounding).
As explained above, we infer the search shares as a function of officer and team char-
acteristics and the officer’s suspect and patrol shares. To do this, we infer each officer’s
propensity to search Asian and Black people, called θAsian and θBlack, and then transform
these propensities into search shares. In Figure 2, we show the posteriors of these coef-
ficients. We find no credible evidence that officer age and ethnicity are associated with
search shares. Officer gender and experience play a minor role where female or experi-
enced officers search fewer ethnic minorities. Relative to the other associations, they are
scarcely meaningful.
Instead, we find associations of search shares with officer-level suspect and patrol
shares. The association with Asian suspect shares is positive, meaning that officers with
a higher share of Asian crime suspects also have a higher Asian search share. Interestingly,
the association with Black suspect shares is negative, meaning that officers who encounter
more Black crime suspects have lower Black search shares. The association with patrol
shares is more intuitive: the ethnic composition of searches reflects that of the areas
officers patrol. In principle, this admits two competing hypotheses: Either, officers are
searching at random or they explicitly adjust for the population in their patrol areas. As
we demonstrate in the next section however, officers over-search ethnic minorities relative
to their patrolling areas which suggests that officers do not search at random.
Last, we comment on our team-level results. In predominantly White teams, Asian
and Black people make up a lower share of searches than in more ethnically diverse teams.
While it would be preferable to differentiate between Black and Asian officers, we have
to treat them as a single group in the analysis as there is insufficient variance in the
separate shares of Black and Asian officers in a team, due to the lower numbers of non-
White officers in our sample. Our Bayesian model includes team-specific intercepts to
account for differences in search shares between teams. The results show that the ethnic
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composition of searches varies considerably between teams as evidenced by the intercepts’
standard deviations. Specifically, they are 0.35 (90% UI [0.27, 0.46]) for Asian searches
and 0.43 (90% UI [0.34, 0.57]) for Black searches. Presumably, these differences are due
to team specialisation, as officers’ routines are determined by their responsibilities.
Measures of officer over-searching
Next, we discuss officer over-searching relative to crime suspects (DS) and relative to
patrol (DP ). We first show draws from the posterior distributions of DS and DP in
Figure 3. Again, the distributions represent the aggregate over officer-specific posteriors
and, as such, the behaviour of the entire workforce of searching officers in our sample.
The median officer over-searches Asian people by a factor of 1.56 (90% UI [0.80, 6.92]),
Black people by a factor of 1.41 (90% UI [0.41, 12.37]) and under-searches White people
by a factor of 0.84 (90% UI [0.51, 1.23]) relative to suspects. The uncertainty intervals
for Asian and Black searching are wide on the aggregate because they also are wide on
the officer-level. The interpretation is that we are uncertain about the precise level of
officers’ search bias against ethnic minorities relative to suspects, but officers are more
likely to over- than under-search Asian and Black people. In contrast, the results for
White disparities are clear: More than half of officers under-search White people relative
to suspects.
We can be more confident about the actual levels of over-searching relative to patrol.
The right-hand side of Figure 3 shows that the median officer over-searches Asian people
by a factor of 1.03 (90% UI [0.58, 2.24]), Black people by a factor of 1.78 (90% UI [1.06,
4.40]) and under-searches White people by a factor of 0.88 (90% UI [0.64, 1.25]) relative
to patrol.
The summaries of DS and DP presented so far are coarse: They only allow us to make
statements about the aggregate of all officers. To refine the resolution, we compute the
posterior probability that an individual officer over-searches a particular ethnic group,
both relative to suspects and patrol from the posteriors of the officer-specific disparities.
We do this by calculating for each officer how many of the posterior draws of the officer-
specific over-searching distributions DS and DP generated by our model are above 1.
For example, if this probability is 1, then the officer always over-searches. Similarly, if
this probability is 0.5, the officer’s search shares perfectly match the suspect or patrol
baselines.
Figure 4 shows histograms of these probabilities for all officers. The left-hand side
is in line with what we have already seen on the aggregate in Figure 3: Most officers
over-search Asian and Black people while virtually all officers under-search White people
relative to suspects. However, the right-hand side of Figure 4 reveals a pattern that
would be left obscured by only studying the aggregate. Particularly, we observe a split
8
between officers: Some officers under-search Asian people, while others consistently over-
search them relative to patrol. Since these officer groups are of roughly the same size, the
aggregate incorrectly suggests that officers do not over-search Asian people. In contrast,
the officer-level results for Black and White people match the aggregate: Virtually all
officers over-search Black people relative to patrol. In fact, 86% of the officers have a
posterior probability of over-searching Black people that exceeds 0.95. Similarly, the vast
majority of officers under-search White people relative to patrol. There is no change and
no discernible dependence in DS and DP over time, a point we explore in more detail in
the appendix.
Officer- compared to force-level bias
Last, we discuss the implications of our officer-level results on the overall over-representation
of ethnic minorities in stop and search. The median officer patrols more ethnically diverse
areas than are representative for the police force’s area of operation. For the remainder of
the analysis, we only consider over- and under-searching relative to the patrolling baseline.
This is because while police forces have direct control over patrolling decisions, the same
cannot be said for the ethnic composition of suspects they encounter. Thus, analysing
patrolling decisions allows us to decompose over-searching into officer- and force-level
decision making.
Our analysis so far treats the officer patrolling areas as given. However, patrolling
areas are not allocated at random. Rather, police departments’ deployment decisions are
the consequence of prioritising certain areas. Similarly to how we constructed an officer-
specific measure of over-searching relative to patrol, we can construct a force-level measure
of over-searching relative to population share. This allows us to multiplicatively decom-
pose force-level over-searching into three factors: officer over-searching, over-patrolling












× Officer patrol share
Population share
× Force search share
Officer search share
Officer over-searching is just DP—our measure of officer over-searching by an officer
relative to patrol. Over-patrolling is the disparity between the individual officer’s patrol
share and the population share in the police force area. Last, the aggregation discrepancy
is the disparity between the force-level search share and the officer’s individual search
share. In some sense, the aggregation discrepancy is simply a mathematical artefact to
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allow for the decomposition. It represents how different this officer’s search share is from
the overall force-level search share. As we will see below its distribution represents the
variation of officer search shares in relation to the force-level aggregated search share.
For example, we can decompose the over-searching of Asian people based on the me-
dians of these three terms. Relative to population, Asian people are over-searched at
the force-level by a factor of 0.2506/0.1982 ≈ 1.26, which is their share in all searches
by the police force divided by their population share. Median officer over-searching is
0.2335/0.2304 ≈ 1.01 which means that the median police officer does not over-search
Asian people relative to patrol. Median over-patrolling is 0.2304/0.1982 ≈ 1.16 meaning
that the median officer over-patrols Asian communities by a factor of 1.16. The aggrega-
tion discrepancy is 0.2506/0.2335 ≈ 1.07 meaning that the median officer search share is
slightly higher than the force-level average Asian search share.
Of course, any summary based on medians alone would be unsatisfactory. We therefore
study the distributions over these three terms as induced by the officer-specific posteriors.
On a practical level, this entails calculating them for every draw from each officer-specific
posterior, the result of which is shown in Figure 5. Note that the distributions of officer
over-searching shown in Figure 5 are the same as in Figure 3. At this point, it is important
to recall that aggregated officer over-searching of Asian people obscures that some officers
over- and some officers under-search Asian people relative to patrol which “cancels out”
on the aggregate, resulting in a median of 1.01. This is only a concern for Asian over-
searching since only there did the officer-level patterns differ from the aggregate. Taken
together, the over-representation of Asian people in stop and search is accounted for by
a combination of over-patrolling and some officer over-searching, though on aggregate
officers do not over-search Asian people.
Black over-searching decomposes differently: Relative to the population Black people
are over-searched at the force-level by a factor of 2.79 which is primarily accounted for by
officer over-searching. Still, over-patrolling also contributes to the overall over-searching of
Black people. Last, we find that White people are under-searched at the force level. This
is primarily accounted for by officers under-searching White people but also by under-
patrolling of White areas. As we already saw in Figure 1, there is some variation between
officers in their shares of White searches which is reflected in the aggregation discrepancy
as officers’ search shares vary relative to the force-level average.
Discussion
Ethnic minorities are over-represented in stop and search compared to both their repre-
sentation in the population and in crime. Our analysis exploits a panel of officers’ searches
from a major police force in England. We investigate the role of individual officers and
10
police structures in the over-searching of ethnic minorities in stop and search.
For each officer, we first infer officer-specific search shares—the share of an ethnic group
in an officer’s searches. The ethnic composition of officers’ searches is not meaningfully
explained by officer characteristics. For example, an officer’s ethnicity is not associated
with the officer’s searches, which matches some the mixed literature on the effect of officer
ethnicity on policing outcomes79,80,81,82 and differs from some of it83,84. Instead, the ethnic
compositions of officers’ crime suspect encounters (suspect share) and of the officers’
patrolling areas (patrol share) are associated with the ethnic composition of searches.
In exploring team compositions, we uncover a nuanced role of officer ethnicity. We
find that teams’ ethnic compositions are associated with officers’ search behaviour: Teams
that are more homogeneously White have lower minority search shares. Officers preferring
to interact (or being tasked with interacting) with members of their own ethnicity alone
cannot explain this association because more diverse teams search more Black people, yet
most of this diversity is due to Asian officers and not Black officers, of whom there are
very few. Instead, stereotype threat could explain why homogeneously White teams are
associated with fewer searches of ethnic minorities as predominantly White teams might
feel stereotyped as racist and avoid searches of minorities85.
In a second step, we infer an officer’s bias of over-searching an ethnic group relative
to crime suspects or to patrol. Almost all officers over-search Black people both relative
to how they encounter them as crime suspects and relative to the areas officers patrol.
Similarly, almost all officers under-search White people relative to crime suspects or to
patrol. For Asian people, we find that almost all officers search Asian people more than
they encounter them as crime suspects. Relative to their patrol areas however, the picture
shifts and officers are split into two groups, one that over-searches and another that under-
searches Asian people which cancels out on the aggregate. One possible explanation for the
split might be the pooling of diverse ethnic identities of people with Indian, Bangladeshi
or Pakistani backgrounds into a singular ‘Asian’ group. Search rates are not equal for
these different groups and individuals with Indian backgrounds are searched at lower
rates1. The split of officer over-searching relative to patrol might then be an artefact of
this pooling of ethnic identities.
Such disproportionate contact with police relates back to use of force. Ross, Winter-
halder and McElreath62 demonstrate that pooled analyses of use of force conditioned on
the rates with which police encounter civilians can be confounded if officers differ in how
often they encounter minorities. We find that officers indeed differ in how often they come
into contact with ethnic minorities (for example, by searching them) and this cannot be
explained by differential crime rates. Furthermore, even if officers were to use force on
ethnic groups equally conditional on coming into contact with them, the fact that they
have more contact with ethnic minorities means that these groups are subjected to higher
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levels of police use of force (Eckhouse, unpublished manuscript). Of course, this not only
applies to use of force but also other policing activities such as misdemeanour enforcement
or arrests and emphasises the importance of documenting these disparities.
Regarding our findings of over-searching minorities relative to patrol, it is important
to note that the patrol share is based on residential data from the 2011 ONS Census. The
population available on the street, the ‘available population’, can be markedly different
from the residential population86. In particular, the ethnic make up of the available popu-
lation can be different from the residential population and potentially account for the bias
against ethnic minorities87,88. On the other hand, the available population explanation
can be another self-fulfilling prophecy similar to the crime explanation89,90: If officers are
deployed to areas with ethnically diverse available populations then the available pop-
ulation will predictably ‘explain away’ the bias compared to the residential population.
That does not make the deployment decision bias-free. Other studies suggest that other
area features such as its affluence also influence officers’ readiness to initiate searches16.
Search decisions have to be based on sufficient groups that a specific person is suspicious,
not general availability of an ethnic group or general features of the area22,23.
Deployment decisions are relevant to our analysis. Minority communities are over-
patrolled: The median officer patrols an area which is 1.16 times more Asian and 1.37
times more Black than all of West Midlands. The overall over-representation of ethnic
minorities in stop and search decomposes into officer bias and over-patrolling. With
officers over-searching minorities and command deploying officers to more diverse areas,
the effects of officer biases are exacerbated by these deployment decisions. This results in
more over-searching of minorities than can be attributed to officer biases alone.
The over-policing of minority communities documented in our study is supported by a
wide range of other studies finding the same phenomenon15,35,36,91,92,93,94,95. Addressing
the common question if these deployment biases can be explained by crime patterns is
difficult. By their presence in an area, police are more likely to observe and record crime
there. The observation of crime then is not independent from patrolling and searching
patterns (and the ethnic biases therein). Other data collected independently of police
presence such as calls for service or crimes reported by the public could plausibly provide
a better benchmark of criminal activity. Yet, with the data available to us we cannot make
any statement as to the mechanism that causes minority areas to be over-patrolled or the
role of crime in that. Here, we only note that over-patrolling accounts for a considerable
part of the overall over-searching of ethnic minorities.
There are clear limitations to our analysis, especially related to the generality of our
findings. The policing context in the United Kingdom is particular, due to public and
political scrutiny of police forces and the specific nature of the relationship between mi-
nority communities and the police. More officer-level analyses are needed and we hope
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that more police forces make officer-level data available to researchers. Furthermore, we
hope that future work can clarify the process of deployment decisions.
For policy-makers, police forces and advocates looking to address the over-representation
of ethnic minorities in stop and search, our results are both concerning and promising.
Concerning, because our results show that 1. officer bias is a key factor in the over-
representation of ethnic minorities in stop and search and 2. this officer bias is exacerbated
by where police officers are deployed to. Promising, because our results could indicate a
multiplier effect of institutional change where a reduction in anti-Asian and anti-Black
bias in the police force applies both the searching officers on the street and to the offi-
cers making deployment decisions. Clearly, police forces should carefully examine their
deployment policies as an amplifier in the over-representation of ethnic minorities in stop
and search. Additionally though, we find that teams’ ethnic compositions impact the
composition of officers’ searches. Addressing the norms and environment of officer teams
could then change officers’ behaviour rather than just reduce its effect55. Our work shows
that police forces need to reconcile the joint role of officer behaviour and department-level
decisions in ethnic disparities in stop and search.
Methods
Data
Our data covers the period between 01/04/2014 and 30/09/2018 which we split into nine
periods of 6 months each, beginning from 01/04/2014. We chose this time resolution
because periods shorter than 6 months result in sparse officer-level information. Officers
which performed searches in fewer than 50% of the half-year periods, i.e., in fewer than
five half-year periods out of the nine in our study period were excluded to avoid data
sparsity issues. The final file covers 1,194 officers observed in 29 teams, 203,176 reported
crimes and 36,028 searches.
In our model, we use the following variables: counts of officers’ searches; counts of
officers’ crime suspect encounters; counts of residents in officers’ patrolling areas, all bro-
ken down by ethnic group; officer gender (dummy encoded); officer age; officer experience
and two dummy variables indicating whether officer i is Asian or Black. We standardise
officer age and officer experience to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. We summarise
these variables in Table 1.
Officers transfer between teams during our study period. We account for this in our
model with the team-specific intercept αj. All officers are assigned to the team j they
were part of for the majority of the time in each 6-month period.
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Multinomial model
We begin this section by an informal discussion of the model, which is then followed by
a more technical presentation.
Every officer in our sample performs a number of Asian, Black and White searches
in a given timeframe. We are then interested in characterising the composition of the
searches by an officer: Which percentage of the officer’s searches were searches of Asian
people? To do this, we employ a multinomial model where the search shares are a non-
linear combination of officer characteristics such as age and team characteristics such as
team composition. We then repeat this procedure to characterise the ethnic composition
of the officer’s patrolling area and interactions with crime suspects. Based on these three
officer- and timeframe-specific shares (searches, patrol and crime) we then build our two
measure of disparities of relative to crime suspects and patrol.
More formally, our data are counts of searches of ethnic group e by officer i in time
period t. For each officer we thus have a vector Yit ∈ NE0 where E = 3 are the three ethnic
groups we consider: Asian, Black and White, which we abbreviate to A,B,W for ease of
notation.
We are then interested in the proportions of each ethnic group in the total number of
searches by officer i in t as a function of covariates. Formally, we model the allocation
of total number of searches by i in t,
∑
e∈{A,B,W} Yite (shortened to
∑
e Yite for ease of






, p = Softmax(θit). (1)
In words, Equation (1) states that each observation vector Yit is modeled by the the
vector θit ∈ RE where θit gives an officer’s propensity to search ethnic group e as a
function of some covariates. To obtain valid proportions, we use the Softmax(·) function
which normalises a vector of real numbers into a vector of proportions that sum to 1.
This means that p = Softmax(θit) gives the proportion of each ethnic group e in
∑
e Yite,
the quantity of interest.
However, θit is not yet identifiable because the same values of p = Softmax(θit) can be
induced by different θit. This is easily resolved by setting θitWhite = 0. In doing so, θitAsian
and θitBlack then represent an officer’s propensity to search Asian or Black individuals
compared to searching White people and θit is uniquely identified.
We model θit as a function of the demographic covariates listed in Table 1. The coef-
ficients of these covariates represent their relative contribution to an officer’s propensity
to search Asian or Black people over White people. In modelling θit we are particularly
interested in the contribution of an ethnic group’s proportion in the officer’s crime suspect
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population and the contribution of an ethnic group’s proportion in the officer’s residential
population in the patrolling area.
We observe a vector of counts of crime suspects and a vector of counts of residents
encountered on patrol. We then infer the proportions of each group in those vectors.
To this end, we introduce four additional terms: Sit, ζit, Pit and ρit. Similarly to Yit,
Sit ∈ NE0 is a vector holding counts of crime suspect encounters by officer i in t for E = 3
ethnic groups. Because we do not use any covariates to model the allocation of Sit, we
can directly model the proportions rather than using the Softmax(·) transformation from
before. ζit is the vector directly giving the suspect shares, that is the proportions of each
ethnic group e in Sit. The remaining two terms follow the same logic: Pit gives counts
of residents encountered on patrol by officer i in time period t. ρit directly models the













Taken together, this corresponds to the following model:
θitAsian = αj[it]A + βA x
′
it A + γA ζitA + δA ρitA + ωAwj[it]
θitBlack = αj[it]B + βB x
′
itA + γB ζitB + δB ρitB + ωBwj[it]
θitWhite = 0,
where αj[it]e is an ethnicity-specific group-level intercept corresponding to the team officer
i was part of in time period t. x′ite is a vector holding i’s covariate information at t specific
to ethnic group e. wj[it] gives the share of White officers in the team officer i was in in
time period t.
Modeling suspect and patrol shares as the allocation of suspect and patrolling counts
allows us to account for measurement error. For example, if an officer encounters only
few crime suspects, then the uncertainty in the suspect shares will be large because the
estimates are based on few data points. The uncertainty in the shares will then be
propagated forward to the inference on γ and δ such that noisier, less certain shares
receive less weight than shares inferred from sufficient amounts of data.
We specify prior distributions on model parameters as follows: The group-level in-
tercepts αj ∼ N(µα, σα) where µα ∼ N(0, 1) and σα ∼ N+(0, 1) (half-normal) and all
regression coefficients β, γ, δ, w ∼ N(0, 2). For ζ we use weakly informative Dirichlet pri-
ors parametrised with the respective share of each ethnic group in all arrests in England
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in the year 2016/17. (The Home Office does not publish crime by ethnicity.) This yields
the prior ζ ∼ Dirichlet(0.43, 0.61, 5.00) corresponding to country-wide shares of (0.07,
0.10, 0.82). Similarly, for ρ we use the share of each ethnic group in England in the 2011
ONS census: ρ ∼ Dirichlet(0.39, 0.21, 5.00) which corresponds to shares of (0.07, 0.04,
0.89)96,97.
We fit the full model with Stan in R version 3.6.3 using rstan version 2.19.398,99.
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling was performed on four chains with each 1,000 warm-up
draws and 1,000 sampling draws, resulting in 4,000 draws from the posterior distribution
in total.
The fit of the model to the observed data is checked in Extended Data Figure 3.
Data availability
This research is based on data resources provided by West Midlands Police. Data were
originally collected as part of routine police record keeping. The data are not available
publicly and were provided to the authors under an Information Sharing Agreement with
West Midlands Police. Under the terms of this agreement, the authors are not at liberty
to share the data. Other researchers can contact West Midlands Police to obtain a data
sharing agreement.
Code availability
All code used to produce the results is available online on Github at https://github.
com/laravomfell/ethnic_bias_stop_and_search. Since the original data from West
Midlands Police may not be shared publicly, we generate synthetic data to demonstrate
our code. The repository includes a folder /data which contains the synthetic data
as well as the file code/generate synthetic data.R used to generate the data. The
distributions of the variables in the synthetic data match the distributions in our data.
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Figures
Figure 1: Posterior densities of search shares pite over all 1,194 officers and 9 time periods
from the full model, resulting in 10,103 observations. Search shares are the proportion
of each ethnic group in the officer’s searches. The black dot represents the medians of
the distributions aggregated over e and t and represent search shares for the median
officer. Black lines show 50% and 90% uncertainty intervals which represent the spread of
behaviour by 50% and 90% of the police officer workforce. There are multiple modes in
the posteriors which simply means that there are different clusters of officers with similar
search shares. (For a version disaggregated by time see Extended Data Figure 1.)
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Figure 2: Posterior densities of the coefficients used to infer search shares p. A positive
effect on θAsian means a larger Asian search share. Similarly, a positive effect on θBlack
implies a larger Black search share. Black dots show the median of the posteriors while
black lines show 50% and 90% uncertainty intervals which contain 50% and 90% of the
posterior distribution. For visual clarity we show the associations of officer gender, age,
experience and ethnicity on a zoomed in scale of [-0.25, 0.25] compared to the others.
The figure is based on 10,103 observations. A table of the medians and 90% uncertainty
intervals is available as supplementary information.
Figure 3: Posterior densities of DSite and D
P
ite aggregated over all officers and time periods.
The distributions represent the behaviour of the entire workforce of searching officers.
The black dots represent the median officers and the black lines represent 50% and 90%
uncertainty intervals. Note that the x-axes of both panels are on the log-scale. For visual
clarity, we only show values between [0.3, 13]. 3% of all posterior probability is excluded
by this choice. The figure is based on 10,103 observations. (For a version disaggregated
by time see Extended Data Figure 2.)
Figure 4: Histograms of the posterior probabilities of DSite and D
P
ite above 1 for each officer
where the posterior probability gives how many of the 4,000 posterior draws from an
officer-specific distribution are above 1. If the posterior probability above 1 for an officer
is 1, the the officer always over-searches an ethnic group. If the posterior probability
above 1 for an officer is 0.5 then the officer’s search shares perfectly match the suspect or
patrol baselines. The figure is based on 10,103 observations.
Figure 5: Decomposition of over-searching into officer over-searching, over-patrolling and
aggregation discrepancy. Grey areas show posterior densities of terms calculated based on
officers’ entire posterior distributions. Black dots represent the median of these densities




Table 1: Means, standard deviations (SD), minima and maxima of the variables in the
final data file.
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Time-varying variables per half-year
Search counts
Asian 2.41 4.55 0.00 76.00
Black 1.72 4.13 0.00 94.00
White 5.39 9.18 0.00 125.00
Suspect counts
Asian 10.61 12.30 0.00 80.00
Black 8.29 8.87 0.00 97.00
White 43.41 40.71 0.00 212.00
Patrolling counts
Asian 85.56 46.95 0.00 349.00
Black 32.30 19.45 1.00 145.00
White 200.84 49.62 37.00 343.00
Officer age in years 37.78 7.34 19.08 62.00
Standardized officer age 0.00 1.00 -2.55 3.30
Officer experience 10.81 5.25 0.17 30.42
Standardized officer experience 0.00 1.00 -2.02 3.73
Fixed variables
Female officer 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Asian officer 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00
Black officer 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
Number of observed half-years per officer 8.46 1.14 5.00a 9.00
Share of White officers in team 0.93 0.06 0.81 1.00
Total number of observations (officers × half-years) N = 10,103
Number of officers N = 1,194
Number of teams N = 29
a We exclude officers with fewer than 5 half-years’ worth of observations (see Data section)
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